Committee

This week, I covered a fascinating effort to preserve organs outside the body. There’s a huge shortage of donor organs, and one of the main reasons is time—they survive only a matter of hours outside the body, even when they’re kept on ice. Doctors dream of organ banks—stores of human organs that can be preserved for days, weeks, months, or even longer. That would allow them to run tests on organs, find the best matches for them, and transport the organs to those recipients. In new research, one team has been able to supercool the kidneys of pigs—animals whose organs are of a similar size to human ones—and preserve them for days. The kidneys survived being stored at −4 °C (25 °F) and eventually reimplanted back into pigs. And that’s just the latest development in a field that is positively buzzing. It has proved super difficult to freeze organs. Once ice forms in them, they’re done. The ice crystals create all kinds of damage and render the organs unusable. That hasn’t stopped many researchers from trying. Some have focused on cryopreservation—rapid extreme cooling that essentially leaves cells in a glasslike state. This process is now routine for eggs, sperm, and embryos, which are cooled to −196 °C in less than two seconds and can be used even after decades in storage. No one has managed to cryopreserve and thaw human organs for transplantation. But plenty of human bodies and brains have been stored at ultra-low temperatures in the hope that they might one day be rewarmed and brought back to life. (You can read more about why some people opt for cryonics here.) In March, I wrote about Stephen L. Coles, a gerontologist who had opted to cryopreserve his own brain. After the scientist died in 2014, his body was taken to Alcor, a cryonics facility in Arizona. A team at the facility removed Coles’s head, perfused his brain with cryoprotective chemicals (which work like antifreeze), removed the brain from the skull, and cooled it to −146 °C. When Coles’s friend Greg Fahy, a cryobiologist, studied pieces of his brain years later, he found that the brain cells, which had shrunk, “bounced back” once they were rewarmed. But that doesn’t mean the cells are alive, or that it might one day be possible to reanimate the brain. As Matthew Powell Palm of Texas A&M told me at the time: “There are so many ways those neurons could be toast.” Powell Palm is working on other ways to preserve organs. It was he, along with his colleagues, who managed to store supercooled pig kidneys and successfully transplant them, in a study described as “a landmark achievement.” Those organs did better than kidneys stored on ice, he says. His approach didn’t require cryoprotectants. But other teams are exploring potential chemical cocktails that might allow them to store organs at lower temperatures, potentially for longer periods of time. (More on this in The Checkup soon!) Another way to prolong the lifespan of an organ is to use a machine that perfuses it with nutrients, mimicking what happens inside the body. Machine perfusion devices have become more commonly used over the last decade or so and are typically used to maintain livers and kidneys for up to about 24 hours. Researchers are now adapting this protocol for a growing list of organs, even eyeballs—a recent feat that might enable whole-eye transplants. In March, I went to visit scientists in Valencia who had developed a perfusion system for uteruses. They had used their device—which they nicknamed “Mother”—to keep a human uterus alive for a day. It’s an exciting time for organ preservation. Keep an eye out for more coverage from MIT Technology Review in the coming weeks. This article first appeared in The Checkup, MIT Technology Review’s weekly biotech newsletter. To receive it in your inbox every Thursday, and read articles like this first, sign up here.

The line in the response object You call the API. You pass model: “claude-fable-5”. You get back a completion, a token count, and a field that reads “model”: “claude-opus-4-8”. Nothing errored. Nothing retried. The request was classified before generation began, matched a sensitive category, and was handed to a different set of weights entirely. Anthropic documented this when it brought Fable 5 back on July 1: blocked requests are sent to Opus 4.8 instead, and the user is notified. The switch happens at the API layer, and the response object names the model that actually ran. That is the well-behaved version. It is also, as far as I can tell, the only version in wide deployment that tells you the truth in-band. Two weeks later, Cursor shipped Router: a classifier trained on 600,000-plus live requests that reads each query’s context, complexity, and domain and dispatches it to whichever model it judges best with three early-access accounts reporting 30–50% savings against routing everything to Opus 4.8. Cursor published its routing rules but did not name a specific model per task type. And underneath both, at the aggregation layer, OpenRouter warns that some providers serve quantized weights at lower prices, that output can differ from what full-precision weights would have produced, and that your logs will not tell you this happened. Three products. Three different answers to the question what is a model. Zero cases telling us which one the law will accept. Three ways a name can stop meaning a thing Model identity is fracturing along three independent axes, and they are not usually distinguished: Substitution – A different architecture, different weights, different capability profile – dispatched by a classifier. Fable 5 → Opus 4.8. Cursor Auto → whatever the router picks this turn. Degradation – The same model, served at reduced precision. OpenRouter exposes a quantizations parameter precisely because quantized endpoints may perform worse on certain prompts, and by default requests are load-balanced across providers ordered by price. Same name in your request. Different arithmetic on the other end. Drift – The same name pointing at silently updated weights. Every -latest alias in production is an unversioned dependency you would never tolerate in a package manifest. The engineering community treats all three as reliability problems. They are also identity problems, and identity is what contracts, warranties, disclosures, and evidence rules are built on. So what did you actually buy? Start with the oldest question in commercial law: was the description a term of the deal? If an API call were a sale of goods, this would be near-trivial. UCC §2-313(1)(b) makes any description of the goods that forms part of the basis of the bargain into an express warranty that the goods will conform to it. India’s Sale of Goods Act, 1930, §15 does the same work through the doctrine of sale by description. But an inference API almost certainly isn’t goods. Courts have generally treated hosted software as a service, which pushes you out of warranty statutes and into common-law contract — where the answer depends entirely on what the documentation said and how specifically the buyer bargained. That is precisely where the ambiguity lives. Enterprise agreements price per-model. Model cards are model-specific. Compliance artifacts name model versions. And then the routing layer treats the name as a hint. The cleanest way to see the stakes: if your code pins a model ID rather than expressing a capability requirement, behaviour can shift materially without any error ever firing. A contract drafted the same way has the same defect. If you bargained for a name, substitution is breach. If you bargained for a capability, substitution is fine — and now you need a definition of “frontier quality” that survives cross-examination. Nobody has written that definition. Cursor’s is instructive: Router was evaluated in an online A/B test optimising for user satisfaction as the reward signal. That is a sound engineering choice and a strange contractual one. Satisfaction is not conformity. A user who never noticed the swap is evidence of a good router, not of a delivered specification. The disclosure gradient Under FTC deception doctrine, a representation is actionable when it is material and likely to mislead a consumer acting reasonably; objective performance claims additionally require a reasonable basis before dissemination. Both halves bite here. On the routing side, the three products sit at very different points. Anthropic notifies and returns the served model in the response. Cursor publishes rules but not per-task model assignment. OpenRouter’s quantization variance is disclosed in documentation and controllable by parameter but it is opt-out, and the default path is the cheap one. Disclosure buried in a docs page, defaulted against the user, is exactly the fact pattern regulators have been calling a dark pattern in every other consumer vertical. On the substantiation side, the exposure is the claim, not the routing. Commentators have already flagged that a “60% cheaper, no quality loss” claim arrives without published methodology, and Anthropic’s own disclosure is a model of what candour costs: it stated plainly that the retrained classifier flags benign requests more often during routine coding and debugging. That sentence is a liability shield. The vendors who don’t write it are the ones to watch. There is a competition-law tail here too. Working papers on vertical foreclosure in inference markets are already proposing a conduct framework built on routing transparency, quality-of-service parity, and FRAND-style non-discrimination. A router that is also a first-party model vendor is a self-preferencing engine wearing a cost-optimisation costume. The part nobody is looking at: authentication This is where I think the real fight lands, and it has nothing to do with billing. Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(9) authenticates output by describing the process or system that produced it and showing that the process produces an accurate result. FRE 902(13) and 902(14) go further, letting records generated by an electronic system, or data verified by hash, self-authenticate on certification. India’s Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, §63 does the analogous work, conditioning admissibility of an electronic

Andrew Ng has announced OpenWorker, an open-source desktop agent that produces finished work rather than conversation. OpenWorker asks the user for an outcome, not a prompt: a polished document, a Slack reply containing the actual numbers, an updated calendar, a triaged inbox. It then breaks that outcome into steps, works across local files and connected apps, and checks in before anything consequential. The architecture is four layers, and all of them run on your machine The repository contains 119 Python files (~32,400 lines) under coworker/, 149 TypeScript/TSX files under surfaces/gui/, and 78 backend test modules. The stack breaks down as follows: Desktop shell — a Tauri 2 native window wrapping a React 18 UI. The bundle identifier is com.openworker.desktop, and the shell supervises the Python server itself. Local agent server — Python 3.10+ on FastAPI and uvicorn, binding to 127.0.0.1:8765 by default. The example config caps a turn at 12 modeltool iterations. Capability and connector layer — vetted local tools (files, git, ripgrep-backed search, shell, todo) plus hosted integrations plus MCP. Model router — one interface over native, OpenAI-compatible, reseller and local providers. The engine is built on aisuite, Andrew Ng’s provider-agnostic LLM library. Bring your own model, from a deliberately small curated list There is no OpenWorker inference service. The user pastes an API key, or points the app at a local runtime. The curated model matrix contains exactly 30 entries. Native providers cover OpenAI (GPT-5.6 Sol/Terra/Luna and GPT-5.5), Anthropic (Claude Fable 5, Opus 4.8, Sonnet 4.6, Haiku 4.5) and Google (Gemini 3.1 Pro, 3.6 Flash, 2.5 Pro, 2.5 Flash). OpenAI-compatible vendors add GLM-5.2, DeepSeek V4, Kimi K2.6, MiniMax M2.5, Qwen3 Max, Grok 4.3 and Mistral Large. Open-weight models arrive through Together AI and Fireworks, and fully local models through Ollama, which requires no key at all. The permission engine is the actual engineering story Most desktop agent projects treat approvals as a UI afterthought. OpenWorker treats them as a typed layer. Every tool call is classified into one of four risk classes: read (no side effects), write_local (mutates the workspace, path-scoped), exec (runs commands), and external (side effects off the machine). Five permission modes then decide what happens: discuss and plan are read-only, interactive is the default and asks before writes, commands and external actions, auto allows everything while remaining path-scoped, and custom auto-approves a user-listed set of tools. Two design decisions stand out. First, unattended mode does not raise the autonomy ceiling — it only changes where the human is reached. Prompts that would appear inline are routed to an Inbox, and the session suspends until answered. Second, task-scoped standing rules are restricted to external risk only. Shell commands ask forever, by design. The built-in ops persona also instructs the model to treat content from tools, logs, the web, files and incoming messages as untrusted data rather than instructions. That is an explicit prompt-injection posture, written into the shipped persona. Privacy: local-first Model calls go directly from the machine to the configured provider. Conversations, connector tokens and model keys stay local, and the secret store is designed so that secrets never enter the model’s context, prompts or traces. The only cloud component is an optional broker that handles OAuth handshakes for one-click connectors, using Auth0 Authorization Code with PKCE. Connector tokens are handed straight to the machine and are never stored in the cloud. The app is fully functional signed out, using manually pasted credentials. Key Takeaways OpenWorker is Andrew Ng’s MIT-licensed desktop AI coworker that returns finished deliverables, not chat replies. The stack is a Tauri 2 + React shell over a local Python FastAPI agent server built on aisuite. Model access is bring-your-own-key across 30 curated tool-calling models, plus fully local Ollama. A typed risk engine (read/write_local/exec/external) gates every action across five permission modes. Check out the GitHub Repo, the project site, and the announcement. All credit for this research goes to the researchers and developers of this project. The post Andrew Ng Just Released OpenWorker: An Open-Source, Local-First Desktop AI Coworker That Returns Finished Deliverables Instead of Chat appeared first on MarkTechPost.

Cisco Foundation AI has released Antares, a family of security small language models (SLMs) built for one narrow security task. The task is vulnerability localization. Given a vulnerability description and a repository, find the files containing the flaw. Two models are open-weight and available now on Hugging Face, Antares-350M and Antares-1B. Both are Apache 2.0. Cisco team also shipped the Vulnerability Localization Benchmark (VLoc Bench), a 500-task agentic evaluation, under the same license. The main result is not a new state of the art. It is that a 1B model reaches 0.209 File F1. GPT-5.5 reaches 0.229, and a 753B open-weight model reaches 0.186. The problem Antares is scoped to Software security depends on connecting external vulnerability knowledge to internal source code. That knowledge lives in public databases, advisories, and Common Weakness Enumerations. The code lives in repositories that are large, modular, and dependency-rich. Connecting the two is expensive. Devs search unfamiliar code, follow naming conventions, inspect call paths, and compare candidate files. Cisco’s framing is that this first triage step is where the cost concentrates. Antares does not replace the application security toolchain. Cisco is explicit about this. Dev teams still need dependency scanning, secret scanning, dynamic testing, container checks, threat modeling, and expert review. Understanding the Models Antares consists of three decoder-only transformers at 350M, 1B, and 3B parameters. All three initialize from IBM Granite 4.0 checkpoints. They share a tokenizer and architecture: grouped-query attention, SwiGLU MLPs, RMSNorm, RoPE, and shared input/output embeddings. Model Params Base checkpoint Context Layers / hidden / KV heads Status Antares-350M 350M Granite 4.0 350M 32K 28 / 1024 / 4 Open weights Antares-1B 1.6B Granite 4.0 1B 128K 40 / 2048 / 4 Open weights Antares-3B 3B Granite 4.0 Micro 128K Not published Not released How the Agent Loop Works Antares is not evaluated as a standalone sequence model. It runs inside a constrained loop with three tools. The model receives a CWE category description and nothing else. No advisory text, no file hints, no severity details. It then issues read-only terminal commands against a Docker sandbox with networking disabled. Command output is truncated to 2,000 characters before entering the transcript. The budget is 15 terminal calls per task. The model terminates by calling submit_vulnerable_files with a ranked list, or submit_no_vulnerability_found. The submission itself does not count against the budget. Output is a ranked list of file paths plus the exploration trace that produced it. What VLoc Bench measures VLoc Bench draws 500 tasks from 290 unique real-world repositories. Sources are public GitHub Security Advisories across six ecosystems: npm, pip, Maven, Go, Rust, and Composer. It covers 147 unique CWE categories, and 78% of entries carry assigned CVE identifiers. Ground truth is derived from the security patch. Files modified in the fix are labels, with tests, docs, and configuration excluded. The benchmark has two phases: Phase A gives the model the vulnerable snapshot and scores File F1. Phase B gives the patched snapshot and scores True Negative Rate, testing whether the model raises a false alarm on fixed code. Results: task-specific training beats parameter scale The pattern in the data is a capability cliff, not a scaling curve. Antares-3B reaches 0.223 File F1, just under GPT-5.5 (xhigh) at 0.229. Antares-1B reaches 0.209, above GLM-5.2 at 753B parameters, which scores 0.186. Antares-350M reaches 0.135, above Gemma-4-31B at 0.101 and Gemini 2.5 Flash at 0.102. Antares-1B also records the highest recall of any evaluated system at 0.224. Static analysis tools were run under the same evaluation. Semgrep scores 0.086 File F1, CodeQL scores 0.023, and Horusec scores 0.020. Cisco’s reading is that rule-based scanners recover some vulnerable files but cannot adaptively inspect repository context. Where the capability comes from The untrained Granite 4.0 base checkpoints score 0.001, 0.000, and 0.000 File F1 under the identical protocol. They have tool-calling ability and still produce degenerate output inside an agentic loop. Supervised fine-tuning does the heavy lifting. It lifts the three scales to 0.108, 0.188, and 0.198. The SFT corpus is 71.5% cybersecurity reasoning, 15.4% code search trajectories, and 13.1% deep research and general reasoning. All reasoning traces come from a single teacher, GPT-OSS-120B, to avoid cross-teacher distribution shift. GRPO then adds 11% to 25%, with the largest relative gain at 350M. Rewards are verifiable and computed programmatically from trajectory text, with no learned reward model. Components cover localization quality, submission behavior, tool-use compliance, exploration, and malformed-output penalties. The variance effect may matter more than the mean. GRPO cuts run-to-run standard deviation by 42% to 65%. One GRPO evaluation run is a more reliable estimate than one SFT run. There is also a scale-dependent split in learned strategy. After GRPO, the 350M and 1B models use 87% to 89% search commands and submit more files. The 3B model settles at 52% search and 37% read, and submits fewer files at higher precision. The reward never prescribed either policy. Deployment Key Takeaways Antares-1B hits 0.209 File F1 on VLoc Bench, above GLM-5.2 at 753B parameters and Gemini 3 Pro. The Granite 4.0 base checkpoints score ~0.000 under the same protocol, so post-training supplies essentially all the capability. GRPO adds 11-25% File F1 and cuts run-to-run variance 42-65%, which matters more for repeatable CI scans. A full 500-task sweep costs under $1 on one H100, against $12.50 for GLM-5.2 and $141 for GPT-5.5. The strongest variant, Antares-3B, is not released, and Antares has no published Phase B false-alarm numbers. Check out the Models on Hugging Face, Benchmark, GitHub Repo and Mentioned Technical Report. The post Cisco Foundation AI Releases Antares: 350M and 1B Open-Weight Models That Localize Known Vulnerabilities Inside Real Codebases appeared first on MarkTechPost.

arXiv:2607.19336v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic systems large language model (LLM) based architectures capable of reasoning, planning, acting, and coordinating with tools and other agents are rapidly transitioning from research prototypes to production scale deployments across domains such as software engineering, scientific discovery, and finance. While academic work has emphasized benchmarks and algorithmic innovation, deployment raises new challenges around robustness, safety, and reliability. This tutorial brings together researchers and practitioners to explore advances in reasoning and planning, multi agent coordination, and evaluation, highlighting open challenges arising from deployment experience. Through applied case studies in pharmaceutical discovery and financial systems, we analyze common design patterns that make agentic systems successful, and discuss practical mitigation strategies for failure modes, such as verification pipelines, fallback mechanisms, and human in the loop supervision. Attendees will gain a comprehensive view of the field along with concrete design patterns, evaluation checklists, and templates for safe and reliable deployment across industries.